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Abstract

11

Understanding the impacts of coastal storm hazards on all maritime port system

12

stakeholders (e.g. operators, tenants, clients, workers, communities, governments) is essential to

13

comprehensive climate change resilience planning. While direct damages and indirect impacts

14

are quantifiable through economic data and modeling, qualitative data on the intangible

15

consequences of storms are necessary to explicate interdependencies between stakeholders as

16

well as conditions that substantially affect response and recovery capacities. This case study

17

explores Hurricane Sandy storm impacts using evidence solicited from stakeholder

18

representatives and extracted from contemporaneous and technical accounts of storm impacts on

19

the port system at Red Hook Container Terminal, Brooklyn, New York, USA. Results highlight

20

the wide range of direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences impacting

21

stakeholders across institutional boundaries and requiring coordination for recovery, providing

22

insight into stakeholder relationships and dependencies in the post-disaster response and

23

recovery process that are often not fully accounted for in current vulnerability assessment and

24

response planning methodologies.

25

KEYWORDS: resilience planning, disaster recovery, externalized costs

26

1. Introduction

27

Maritime ports are critical to the national transportation infrastructure, providing access

28

to an oceangoing international trade network which accounts for more than 80% of the global

29

trade by volume, including critical imports ranging from vehicles and raw materials to food and

30

medical supplies (UNCTAD 2018). Securing the resilience of the national port infrastructure is

31

a primary economic and defense priority, necessitating robust resilience planning (CMTS 2017).

32

However, ports are inherently exposed to significant risk of harm from coastal storm impacts,
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33

because they must operate at the vulnerable land-sea interface where wind, flood, and storm

34

surge impacts are concentrated (Ng et al. 2016). As climate change leads to rising sea levels and

35

intensified storm impacts in many parts of the globe (Melillo et al. 2014), ports must account for

36

and adapt to these changes over both mid- and long-term planning horizons (Becker et al. 2018;

37

USDOT 2014; EPA 2008).

38

The port stakeholder cluster (De Langan 2004) includes port owners and operators;

39

tenants, shippers, and other port clients; government regulators responsible for the safety and

40

economic vitality of the national port system; and surrounding communities which depend on

41

ports for access to the global economy and for employment (Ward 2001; Becker et al. 2013).

42

Different port stakeholders play different roles in the port’s resilience decision-making, including

43

through direct planning (in the case of internal stakeholders such as owners and operators) and

44

through external economic or political influence (Zhang et al. 2017; Freeman 2010, Bryson

45

2004). In turn, different stakeholders bear the harms and costs of storm impacts to port

46

operations differently as well. In some cases, the harms of a storm impact may not only affect a

47

stakeholder that is directly damaged (e.g., a port operator that must repair damaged cranes), but

48

may also be externalized to other stakeholders throughout the cluster that are do not have direct

49

responsibility or capacity for repairing the damage, but that nevertheless depend on its recovery

50

to resume normal operations (e.g., a shipper that must reroute cargo and defray lost revenue).

51

These externalized harms propagate throughout the stakeholder cluster according to a network of

52

economic and institutional inter-reliance among stakeholders that is not always necessarily fully

53

accounted for or engaged by planning processes (Zhang et al. 2017; Becker et al. 2014; Messner

54

et al. 2015).
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55

A robust understanding of how all harms and costs of storm impacts are either

56

internalized or else propagated throughout the stakeholder cluster is critical to achieve proactive,

57

comprehensive resilience planning (Messner et al. 2015). So too is an understanding of how

58

those impacts function differently in different ports according to each port’s unique

59

circumstances (Becker et al. 2014). Identifying port-specific impacts is a first step toward

60

identifying and deciding between resilience strategies. However, impact assessment methods

61

often do not allow for a detailed understanding of how storm impacts might have differential

62

effects on different components of the stakeholder cluster, whether because the scale of analysis

63

is too broad to capture effects on individual stakeholders (Lian et al. 2007; Hallegatte 2008), or

64

because the scope of analysis is constrained to particular quantifiable impacts, such as insured

65

losses (Grossi et al. 2005) or direct damage to structures (Curtis 2007; LADOT 2006). Because

66

impacts may propagate through the stakeholder cluster as indirect or intangible impacts, not only

67

quantitative but also qualitative data are necessary to comprehensively characterize storm

68

impacts on a port. There is a need for improved integration of qualitative impact data with the

69

quantitative impact modelling and data used in the vulnerability assessment methods that provide

70

the basis for resilience planning and decision making (Aerts et al. 2018; Stempel et al. 2018;

71

Becker et al. 2014; Di Baldassarre et al. 2015). This paper contributes to the field of port policy

72

and management through a theory-based analysis of stakeholders’ perceptions. The cascading

73

impacts resulting from hurricanes have economic, social, and environmental effects on numerous

74

stakeholders throughout a port system. These cascading consequences are still not well

75

understood, nor are they properly accounted for in current port planning practice.

76
77

This case study builds on work conducted by Becker et al in the ports of Gulfport,
Mississippi, USA and Providence, Rhode Island, USA, and seeks to expand and improve the
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78

information available to decision-makers regarding coastal storm impacts for ports confronting

79

key policy decisions in resilience planning (Becker et al. 2014). There is a rich literature

80

describing the value of the case study approach, especially in emerging areas such as climate

81

adaptation and resilience. As Yin states, “The distinctive need for a case-study approach arises

82

out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena” (2008). And, as further elaborated by

83

Flyvbjerg, “a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is

84

a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an

85

ineffective one” (2006).

86

The subject of this case study is the Red Hook Container Terminal (RHCT; the Terminal)

87

in Brooklyn, New York City, New York, USA, a small cargo port in the Port of New York and

88

New Jersey. In October 2012, New York City suffered extensive damage and disruption from

89

Hurricane Sandy. Through targeted interviews with representatives of internal and external

90

stakeholder institutions, as well as assessment of reports on storm impacts to the Port, the case

91

study catalogs stakeholder perceptions of the direct, indirect, and intangible impacts of that

92

major coastal storm on the RHCT stakeholder cluster. Applying the methods used to analyze

93

storm impacts for the ports of Gulfport and Providence in Becker et al. (2014) also allows

94

comparison to the results from those other cities in different regions. The case of RHCT provides

95

insight into the propagation of storm impacts through a dense urban port stakeholder cluster,

96

provides empirical support for a typology of such impacts, identifies nontrivial and non-obvious

97

interdependencies, and contributes to a growing body of evidence that provides the foundation of

98

a nascent area of theory with direct practical applications to port management and policy.
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99
100

2. Description of Red Hook Container Terminal
RHCT is a small port facility in the Port of New York and New Jersey, located one mile

101

south of the Brooklyn Bridge along Buttermilk Channel (Figure 1). It is the only terminal in

102

Brooklyn that serves container ships, handling 55,000 containers in 2016. RHCT handles

103

container, break-bulk, ro-ro, and project cargo, transferring goods to trucks for local delivery

104

throughout Brooklyn and Long Island, as well as for longer highway hauls (Red Hook Terminals

105

2019). Regular services include a CMA CGM round-the-world route that delivers Heineken beer

106

from Europe, and a Seaboard service from the Caribbean and South America carrying bananas.

107

The Terminal also hosts a container barge service across the Upper Bay to Port

108

Newark/Elizabeth, adding an additional 20,000 containers to its annual throughput (Red Hook

109

Terminals 2019).

110
111

Insert Figure 1 – map of Brooklyn and map of terminals about here
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) own the terminal, including

112

four piers and administrative facilities, and Red Hook Terminals LLC operates the facility. The

113

PANYNJ Maritime Commerce Department sets building codes and provides engineering

114

management for capital projects, but does not participate in day-to-day operations. There has

115

been some form of cargo terminal on the site since the 1840’s, and for most of that time,

116

maritime commerce drove the development of the surrounding Red Hook community.

117

Sandy made landfall in Brooklyn on Monday, October 29, 2012 as a post-tropical

118

cyclone. A great deal of the Red Hook neighborhood south and east of the Terminal is built on

119

reclaimed land with very little topographic relief. The combined high tide and storm surge struck

120

low-lying Red Hook with an 11.2ft storm tide, causing an estimated 4.1ft of inundation

121

throughout most of the community (Blake et al. 2013). Because the Terminal naturally slopes
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122

down toward the water, inundation depths were even more severe in seaward parts of the facility;

123

tenants at RHCT’s Pier 7 reported almost 5ft of water in their warehouse. Throughout New York

124

City, 44 deaths were directly attributable to the storm (Jaffe et al. 2015).

125

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) closed New York Harbor waterways and ordered the

126

evacuation of all vessels the day before the storm’s arrival, pursuant to the Heavy Weather Plan

127

developed in collaboration with port stakeholders after Hurricanes Earl in 2010 and Irene in

128

2011. The Port remained closed after the storm until the USCG, in collaboration with the

129

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Geological Survey

130

(USGS), and Sandy Hook Pilots, could survey all waterways for obstructions to navigation,

131

pollution, and shoaling from storm tides. Extended power outages and fuel shortages on land

132

impacted the city for more than a week following the storm; this was compounded by

133

temperatures dropping below freezing, stranding many residents without heat, power, or

134

transportation in icy, slushy conditions. Although the USCG was able to progressively open

135

waterways to municipal sewage scows, then fuel barges, then more traffic over the following

136

days, the fuel terminals which processed and received home heating oil, diesel, and gasoline

137

remained crippled by the power outage, prolonging the fuel shortage even after the Port resumed

138

operation. RHCT received its first cargo vessel on November 6, eight days after the storm.

139

3. Methods

140

This case study was designed to provide qualitative and quantitative storm impact

141

information that is useful to planners and decision-makers with responsibility for implementing

142

resilience plans and policies in U.S. and international ports (Becker et al. 2014). In order to

143

comprehensively capture the range of impacts to the full RHCT stakeholder cluster, ‘impact’ is

144

defined broadly to encompass the full range of direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible
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145

consequences (IPCC 2012) which result from a major storm and which meaningfully disrupt the

146

ability of a stakeholder to engage in normal operations. Direct damages are impacts with discrete

147

costs, which are incurred by the action of flooding, wind, or waves on port facilities, equipment,

148

and contents. Indirect costs to port stakeholder clusters are disruptions to the normal flow of

149

goods and services caused by direct damages or by efforts to recover from them. Direct damages

150

and indirect costs are impacts on the port as an economic system that can be expressed in terms

151

of value lost to one or more stakeholders from the baseline of normal economic conditions.

152

Intangible consequences for port stakeholder clusters encompass the range of impacts that are

153

substantively significant and relevant to stakeholder decision-making but nevertheless are poorly

154

described by economic valuation, such as loss of life, health impairments, or damage to the

155

environment or to cultural heritage.

156

For the purposes of this research, the RHCT stakeholder cluster is defined broadly to

157

include both internal and external stakeholders with an economic or institutional interest in the

158

successful normal operation of the Terminal (Becker et al. 2014). Internal stakeholders include

159

port owners (PANYNJ) and operators (Red Hook Terminals LLC). External stakeholders include

160

economic stakeholders (stakeholders with interests defined through contractual relationships, e.g.

161

tenants, shippers, insurers), public policy stakeholders (government institutions with

162

jurisdictional responsibilities for the port, e.g. USCG, Department of Transportation, state and

163

city agencies), community stakeholders (residents and institutions representing the cultural and

164

economic interests of hinterland communities, e.g. Community Boards, environmental groups),

165

and academic stakeholders (institutions which generate information or scholarship relevant to

166

port decision-making).
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167

The study was designed to elicit two related kinds of information: comprehensive

168

cataloging of storm impacts to RHCT stakeholders, and identification of which stakeholder

169

group(s) (internal, economic/contractual, public policy, and/or community) carried the ‘burden

170

of recovery’ for each impact. The burden of recovery is defined broadly to encompass the

171

investment of financial, human, and institutional resources (i.e., time, effort, and expense) in

172

recovering from an impact; it is sensitive to stakeholders’ perceptions of their own and other

173

stakeholders’ capacity (e.g. technically, financially) and responsibility or authority (e.g. legally,

174

politically) to undertake such recovery activities.

175

The burden of recovery may be borne internally, or it may be externalized to other

176

members of the stakeholder cluster. In the case of direct damages, the burden of recovery is

177

generally borne internally by stakeholder institutions (Becker et al., 2014). For example, a tenant

178

may write off the loss of water-damaged products from its warehouse, or the port operator may

179

pay for replacement electrical equipment using an insurance payout. In the case of indirect costs,

180

economic losses can often become externalized and may not be ‘paid for’ by any one stakeholder

181

institution, but nevertheless may require the time and effort of one or more stakeholder

182

institutions to recover from. For example, the economic impact of damage to USCG aids to

183

navigation is felt by all economic stakeholders because of the disruption to vessel traffic until the

184

waterway is reopened. In that example, the burden of paying for repairs to the navigation aids

185

falls to the USCG (and, by extension, the federal taxpayer). In the case of intangible

186

consequences, some impacts are articulated broadly as an impairment of response capacity (e.g.,

187

the challenge of learning new disaster recovery procedures on the fly), while others can be

188

solved by the explicit efforts of particular stakeholder institutions (e.g., debris which blocks

8

189

roads and impedes repair efforts for stakeholders across the cluster, but which must be addressed

190

by the cleanup efforts of particular stakeholders, such as the city government or landowner).

191

Many of these indirect and intangible harms are externalized throughout the stakeholder

192

cluster. For the purposes of recording and analyzing results, each impact was classified

193

according to the stakeholder who held the burden of recovery only as perceived by the sources.

194

Data were gathered from two types of sources: interviews with port stakeholders and

195

contemporaneous news and retrospective technical reports addressing port damage from the

196

storm. Interviewees were identified through personal contacts, internet research, and referral by

197

other participants. In total, five port stakeholders were interviewed: two representatives of

198

PANYNJ, two representatives of USCG, and one representative of a community group (Table 1).

199

As the Terminal is a small port with limited economic and institutional reach, this sample of the

200

stakeholder cluster, taken in conjunction with the written reports, was considered adequate to

201

capture the experiences of the stakeholder cluster. Interviews were conducted in-person and by

202

telephone, using a semi-structured technique. In one case, two interviewees attended the same

203

interview; their responses were coded individually. The interview instrument (Appendix A) was

204

adapted from Becker et al. (2014) to elicit stakeholder impressions of what impacts from the

205

storm affected their institutions and to what parts of the stakeholder cluster the burden of

206

recovering from those impacts fell. The instrument was approved by the University of Rhode

207

Island Institutional Board. The interviews were recorded and transcribed for coding.

208
209

Insert Table 1 about here
Reports on Sandy’s impacts from academic literature and from contemporaneous news

210

accounts were identified through internet searches and selected according to the criterion that

211

they catalog storm impacts on Red Hook Container Terminal or the broader PNYNJ system, as
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212

reported by members of the port stakeholder cluster. Six scholarly articles and four

213

contemporaneous news reports were collected and coded (Table 2).

214

Insert Table 2 about here

215

Coding procedures from Becker et al. (2014) were employed in this study using the

216

NVivo qualitative data analysis software package to ensure that results were compatible.

217

Interview transcripts and reports were reviewed line-by-line and impacts were provisionally

218

identified. Once all potential impacts were highlighted, they were coded a second time to ensure

219

there was no duplication or conflation, and assigned to common ‘main ideas.’ Finally, ‘main

220

ideas’ were refined into explicit sub-types, and sub-type sets were coded into three top-level

221

types (direct, indirect, intangible impacts). The three top-level impact types used by the

222

International Panel on Climate Change were used for consistency and because they are

223

conceptually comprehensive – any articulable impact fits into at least one impact type (IPCC

224

2012). However, sub-types were coded independently without consulting the Becker et al. results

225

to avoid interpretive bias.

226

Impacts were articulated as specifically as possible to make the results comprehensive

227

and holistic; for instance, the impact of disruption to the flow of food supplies was kept distinct

228

both from the more general impact of disruption of the flow of cargo, and from the causally

229

related impact of waterway closures, according to how the respondent specifically expressed the

230

impact. Each impact mentioned in a written report was considered to have been mentioned only

231

once in that report regardless of how often the words appear in the text itself.

232
233

Once coded, impacts were then assigned to stakeholder groups according to the burden of
recovery. All impacts were parsed in this way, even where interviewees or reports were not
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234

explicit about who ended up bearing the burden, based on the authors’ best interpretation of the

235

contractual or jurisdictional obligations associated with each impact.

236

4. Results

237

Through analysis of five interviews and ten reports, 227 mentions of 82 distinct impacts

238

were identified, including 23 unique direct damage, 31 indirect costs and 28 intangible

239

consequences. The impacts are presented in Tables 3-5, divided into top-level impact types

240

(direct damage, indirect cost, or intangible consequence) and sub-types. For each impact, the

241

stakeholder group which carried the burden of recovering from the impact is identified.

242

4.1 Direct Damages

243

Direct damages, or damages with discrete costs incurred by the direct action of flooding

244

or wind on port facilities, equipment, and contents, are reported in Table 3. Damage to port

245

facilities was severe and widespread. Several structures on the Terminal experienced basement

246

and first floor flooding, and building contents across the Terminal including computer systems

247

and records were extensively damaged. Underground infrastructure such as electric substations,

248

storm drains, and fire pumps was destroyed.

249
250

Insert Table 3 about here
Port equipment was similarly hard hit, with cargo handling equipment disabled either by

251

water damage to engines or salt corrosion of wheels and electrical systems. Six electric gantry

252

cranes, which have their motors installed near ground level, were flooded out. Several of the

253

gantry cranes at RHCT had not yet been converted from diesel to electric to conform to

254

PANYNJ air quality guidance; these cranes were not disabled, while most of the rest of the

255

Port’s crane equipment had to be dismantled and shipped out for refurbishment, which one

256

source reported cost about $160,000 per crane. Some minor damage was done to barges at the
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257

Terminal, although elsewhere in the Port one barge was stranded on a pier. Cargo was seriously

258

damaged, with numerous containers thrown around the Terminal and washed into the waterway.

259

One tenant reported that flooding of its warehouse resulted in $10 million in write-offs.

260

4.2 Indirect Costs

261

Indirect costs, or disruptions to the normal flow of goods and services caused by direct

262

damages or by efforts to recover from them, are reported in Table 4. Key among these costs

263

incidental costs to repairing damages expressed in Table 3, such as assessment, monitoring,

264

security, and the provision of temporary replacement services.

265

Insert Table 4 about here

266

Apart from waterway closures and vessel evacuations, interruptions to operations also

267

stemmed from damage to administrative buildings, which destroyed paper records and disabled

268

computer systems. The interruption was felt by internal stakeholders, from the revenue gap for

269

tenants to lost wages for workers.

270

4.3 Intangible Consequences

271

Table 5 reports intangible consequences, encompassing a broad range of impacts that are

272

relevant to stakeholder decision-making, but nevertheless are poorly constrained by economic

273

valuation. This type includes a number of impacts which could feasibly be classified as direct

274

costs, such as damage to traffic signals, but which were cited by sources as conditions which

275

made recovery more difficult (i.e., the failure of traffic signals making travel to recovery sites

276

harder) rather than simply costs to be paid. In these cases, the impacts were recorded as reported

277

by the source.

278

Insert Table 5 about here
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279

Sources strongly emphasized impacts, both on Terminal property and outside it, which

280

impaired their ability to bring the Terminal back online. Impacts on the Terminal included

281

damage to lighting and roads, debris on roads, and disruptions to communication systems. Not

282

only did the system back up seawater into facilities and make direct drainage impossible, but also

283

waste backed up through the storm drains because the City has a combined sewer system. This

284

meant that all water damage remediation activities required environmental hazard abatement

285

procedures as well.

286

Impacts outside the Terminal included severe cold weather during a fuel shortage, damage to

287

personnel’s homes and communities preventing them from participating in recovery, and the

288

emotional toll of the widespread devastation. Finally, all interviewees discussed the complexity

289

of coordinating disaster relief efforts and funds within their institutional contexts.

290

5. Discussion

291

The experience of RHCT stakeholders in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy demonstrated

292

the advantages and challenges of resilience planning to minimize the propagation of storm

293

impacts through the stakeholder cluster. Ports are highly interconnected and inter-reliant

294

systems. Stakeholders in the port stakeholder cluster rely on the goods and services of other

295

stakeholders through contractual, institutional, and cultural relationships. In a disaster, direct

296

damages to port facilities and resources propagate throughout the cluster along those reliant

297

relationships as indirect costs and intangible consequences.

298

Resilience planning ahead of the disaster event serves to anticipate the propagation of

299

impacts and develop working relationships between stakeholders that can be activated during the

300

response phase to abate impacts. Where impacts were not fully anticipated or working

301

relationships did not exist and had to be developed ad hoc, indirect and intangible impacts served
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302

to impede response and prolong recovery. The specific experiences reported by Red Hook

303

stakeholders demonstrate the propagation of impacts through a port stakeholder cluster (section

304

5.1), and highlight both successes and failures of the port system’s response and recovery

305

attributable to pre-storm planning practices (section 5.2). Comparison to the reported outcomes

306

in a separate case (Gulfport, MS, USA after Hurricane Katrina) provide the basis for discussing

307

generalizable best practices for planning (section 5.3).

308

5.1 Direct damages propagate as indirect costs and intangible consequences

309

Sources reported that before Sandy, hurricanes were considered, and planned for,

310

primarily as wind hazard events. Hurricane Sandy was primarily a storm surge event rather than

311

a wind event. All direct damages to port facilities highlighted in interviews and reports were the

312

results of flooding. One report cited this as the primary reason damage was so extensive: ‘The

313

storm surge was the big issue. With a hurricane you might expect a wind event with some

314

flooding. Instead we had a major flooding event with some wind damage’ (Wakeman & Miller

315

2013, 12).

316
317

Insert Table 6 around here
The building codes for PANYNJ facilities had emphasized protection from wind damage,

318

meaning that a great deal of critical port infrastructure – generators, transformers, motors, and

319

computer systems – was at or below ground level (DesRoches & Murrell 2014). Likewise, the

320

flat topography of the filled land in and around RHCT exposed the area to some of the most

321

severe flooding in the city.

322

The economic impact of the disruption to port commerce propagated to economic

323

dependents of the port in the hinterlands, ranging from clients of tug and barge, water taxi, and

324

ferry services, to the wider consumer goods marketplace. As one interviewee said: ‘there’s a lot
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325

of things that sometimes people forget are on cargo containers, things like blood and food …

326

things that are critical to emergency response. And it took a long time for that to get back up to a

327

moving pace.’

328

Economic hardship was a major point of discussion, especially regarding the disruption

329

of container traffic right at the opening of the holiday shopping season. Although interviewees

330

emphasized that critical port operations such as fuel deliveries came online quickly, container

331

operations took longer to reach pre-storm levels, both because they did not receive the same level

332

of public health emergency prioritization, and because the necessary equipment (e.g., gantry

333

cranes) took longer to repair.

334

The disruption of waiting on other members of the stakeholder cluster to resume

335

operations before being able to conduct one’s own recovery efforts was also discussed as an

336

intangible but significant impact of the storm. One interviewee discussed how operators and

337

tenants could not resume full operations until PANYNJ could bring their own operations fully

338

online. Several sources discussed how all internal Terminal stakeholders relied on the USCG to

339

clear and reopen waterways before resuming port operations. An interviewee reported that

340

Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) lost critical hardware at the Manhattan Cruise Terminal for

341

identifying and processing arriving passengers (e.g., scanning passports), which forced them to

342

turn away a cruise ship which had weathered the storm at sea and subsequently had to be

343

rerouted to Boston. All sources emphasized the reliance of the surrounding community on the

344

port for fuel and for commerce.

345

5.2 Resilience planning builds relational capacity to stem the propagation of impacts

346
347

Resilience planning can provide a mechanism for stakeholders in the port stakeholder
cluster to establish working relationships that can be activated to coordinate response and
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348

recovery. The experience of recovering the channel versus recovering the fuel system highlight

349

the effect of resilience planning in building such institutional relationships. Port hazard planning

350

with internal stakeholders, tenants and clients, and public policy stakeholders including the City

351

and the USCG prepared the port system to abate navigational hazards and reopen the waterways

352

efficiently, minimizing indirect costs and intangible impacts. By contrast, an enduring fuel

353

shortage, which was prolonged and exacerbated by an inability to coordinate response

354

operations, caused a significant portion of indirect costs and intangible consequences suffered by

355

stakeholders across the cluster.

356

5.2.1 Waterway response and recovery

357

The waterways remained closed until impairments to navigation could be abated.

358

Waterway closures were the initial cause of the port shutdown, as the USCG evacuated the

359

harbor before the storm. Immediately after, USCG activated a pre-existing response network of

360

government and non-government vessels to survey the waterways for navigational safety,

361

including identifying debris and shoaling, and assessing the status of aids to navigation - an

362

effort which was impaired by damage to their own equipment and facilities. This process

363

involved repairing aids to navigation and clearing obstacles such as drifting vessels, containers,

364

oil spills, and other various hazards. Floating containers were highlighted by multiple sources as

365

a significant challenge, as they can severely damage a vessel in a collision, but can often float

366

slightly below the water’s surface, making them difficult to avoid.

367

The burden of abating the container problem complicated response efforts. Although the

368

USCG had jurisdictional responsibility to survey and identify containers that had floated off the

369

terminals in the surge, the practical responsibility of who would pay to remove any given

370

container was not always clear. For containers that were sufficiently intact to identify the owner
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371

by serial number, the owner had clear liability to cover the cost of removal. If the container was

372

damaged such that the owner could not be ascertained, and it posed a risk of polluting the

373

waterway, the Coast Guard had access to dedicated funds to cover removal. If the container was

374

damaged and was found in the waterway, the USACE took responsibility for removing it as an

375

obstacle to navigation. However, a great number of containers beached alongside the waterway

376

did not fall into those categories – the Coast Guard surveyed and catalogued these containers but

377

did not have clear guidance on how to obtain funds for their removal. An interviewee reported

378

that in many cases, these containers ended up being removed at the expense of the landowner or

379

the city.

380

Despite uncertainty regarding debris outside the channel, interviewees described that

381

USCG was able to successfully collaborate within the port stakeholder cluster, including

382

PANYNJ, tenants, and pilots, to accelerate waterway inspection and cleanup. USCG prioritized

383

reopening the waterways to key fuel terminal facilities. Priority routes to fuel terminals were

384

restored within days, making possible emergency fuel delivery operations to affected parts of the

385

City. RHCT, as a container terminal, received lower priority but was navigable within eight days.

386

Sources stated that this coordination was possible due to preexisting institutional relationships

387

developed through the disaster recovery planning process.

388

5.2.2 Power system response and recovery

389

The response network developed through prior port resilience planning had not, however,

390

developed similar lines of communication with regional electric utilities. Extensive damage to

391

subterranean infrastructure across the city left the electric grid disabled for days, cutting off

392

internet access and requiring stakeholders to obtain back-up generators. The huge demand for
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393

fuel for generators, combined with the power outage itself disabling otherwise operational fuel

394

terminals, in turn created a severe fuel shortage.

395

As discussed above, USCG prioritized reopening deliveries to certain fuel terminals that

396

had received less damage. This allowed the government to begin to make emergency fuel

397

deliveries to shelters and hospitals. However, many fuel terminals were unable to resume

398

operations due to damaged tanks, flooded pumps, and the ongoing electrical outage.

399

Because the port community was effectively left to sit on its hands waiting for electrical

400

systems to recover, it was not able to stem the fuel shortage even once waterways and terminal

401

facilities were otherwise ready to reactivate. With response and recovery delayed relative to the

402

waterway navigability, sources across the stakeholder cluster reported indirect and intangible

403

effects of the power shortage at a higher rate than those consequent to other direct impacts. As

404

one interviewee reported, ‘[the surrounding communities] had no gas. Many needed gas to fill

405

generators, to get power back up at their house and keep the heat on … As soon as power went

406

out, a lot of people went to generator systems and the generators started to go out. Then at the

407

same time, the temperature dropped pretty precipitously. And so you had this confluence of

408

people needed fuel for heat, fuel for electricity, fuel for their cars, fuel for all sorts of things, and

409

it wasn’t readily available.’

410

Electricity, therefore, represented a bottleneck in the critical path to recovery, which an

411

interviewee indicated was a consequence of the inability of stakeholders to coordinate ahead

412

with the utilities through the resilience planning process. The knock-on, externalized burden of

413

recovering under these circumstances fell to port tenants and operators (e.g., by using backup

414

generators during the repair process) and to the public policy and community groups which
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415

offered emergency services to those without power (e.g., government fuel deliveries by truck,

416

and community aid groups providing warm shelters).

417

5.2.3 Adaptivity in response and recovery

418

Across stakeholder groups, new systems and procedures for communicating, problem

419

solving, and processing paperwork had to be innovated on the fly. One interviewee expressed

420

that the mix of impaired roads, fuel shortages, and damage to personnel’s homes severely short-

421

staffed PANYNJ in the first days after the storm, necessitating that the personnel on hand step

422

into inspection and decision-making roles that were outside their normal work responsibilities.

423

For instance, one interviewee reported that road and rail inspections had to be performed by

424

whoever could report to work on the day after the storm, because most of the regular inspectors

425

lived in New Jersey and couldn’t get into the city by car. This delayed the recuperation of the

426

land transport network and cut off repair personnel and equipment.

427

Because of this complexity, interviewees strongly emphasized the importance of

428

adaptivity and coordination among stakeholders during the recovery process. Several

429

interviewees described coordinating major governmental response efforts using a daisy chain of

430

officials’ personal cell phones, depending on which carrier was online that day.

431

Strong institutional relationships also empowered stakeholders to respond adaptively. For

432

instance, perimeter fences and cameras were destroyed throughout the Port; this brought the

433

Terminal and other Port facilities out of compliance with the Maritime Transportation Security

434

Act (MTSA), which requires terminal operator to continuously maintain security equipment and

435

procedures (MTSA 2002). An interviewee reported that the USCG, which enforces the MTSA,

436

worked with terminal operators across the Port in the hours after the storm to identify breaches

437

and execute temporary plan amendments under USCG regulations to fill the breaches using hired
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438

security monitoring. As the interviewee put it, ‘the minute the Facility Security Officer could get

439

out to the facility and assess what was going on, most of them were on the horn with their

440

corporate headquarters and within 12 hours you had privately hired sheriffs from Louisiana

441

doing gate-guard duty.’ No indirect costs or intangible consequences related to security issues

442

(e.g. looting) were reported by any sources.

443

5.3 Contrasting findings from Gulfport, MS

444

. The Port of Gulfport, MS is Mississippi’s largest port, and it experienced profound

445

damage from Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Becker et al. (2014) reported impacts from Katrina on

446

the port and surrounding community using the same methodology.

447

Nearly all Red Hook interviewees emphasized the rapid turnaround of port recovery.

448

While community stakeholders in Red Hook have indicated that economic recovery in the

449

community has been protracted and remains incomplete, the port system resumed critical

450

operations within 10 days. This stands in sharp contrast with the severe, long-term shutdown at

451

Gulfport and the associated intangible consequences identified, such as supply-side fluctuations

452

in the labor market, complete facility destruction and reconstruction, and permanent loss of

453

revenue or lines of business.

454

This distinction points to a disparity in the economic and institutional capacity of the two ports’

455

different stakeholder clusters to recover, as well as the effectiveness of recovery activities

456

coordination across those clusters. Becker et al. found that existing resilience planning processes

457

in Gulfport revolved around the responsibilities and interests of internal and economic external

458

stakeholders, without involving other external stakeholders, and that, as a consequence, planning

459

processes failed to account for significant portions of the impacts experienced after Hurricane

460

Katrina, especially indirect and intangible impacts which impaired long-term recovery. The
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461

experience of RHCT drives this point home by illustrating that, where resilience planning

462

anticipated impacts and built institutional relationships that could be activated to coordinate

463

response and recovery, response operations brought systems online quickly, such as in the case

464

of waterway debris clearing, whereas unanticipated impacts led to lack of coordination and

465

enduring impairment of recovery, such as in the case of the fuel shortage.

466

6. Conclusion

467

This case study of the Red Hook Container Terminal in Hurricane Sandy extends the

468

methods of Becker et al. (2014) to the highly integrated, intermodal port system of New York

469

City. Interviews with key stakeholders indicated clear interdependencies among stakeholders in

470

ability to storm recovery activities, caused by indirect and intangible impacts which propagated

471

across the stakeholder cluster. Where the disaster planning process had instituted post-disaster

472

coordination frameworks for those interdependencies – such as in the case of regional fuel

473

supplies – stakeholders were able to coordinate and rapidly recover. Where institutional lines of

474

coordination did not exist – such as in the case of the electrical grid – the recovery process was

475

impaired and secondary costs were incurred to endure the impact during the recovery process.

476

The results from Red Hook emphasize that coordination between stakeholder institutions is an

477

effective strategy for efficiently recovering from major storm events. Information like the

478

stakeholder impacts solicited in this project can inform and support the capacity of resilience

479

planning to comprehensively involve all relevant stakeholders in a port system in procedures and

480

investments to build port resilience.
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Appendix A – Interview Instrument
INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT FOR RED HOOK, NEW YORK
Modified from Becker 2014
INFO = Information to be given to informant
Blue = notes for interviewer
OVERVIEW
Respondent Name; Date; Interviewer; Organization; Position.
Section I: Background on institutions and interviewees (5 minutes)
INFO: There are 13 questions, concerned with your organization’s relationship to Red Hook Terminal and to your
organization’s experiences in the aftermath of Sandy. I will record the interview. Your responses to these questions
will be kept private, and neither your name nor your organization’s name will be tied to any specific response, either
in internal transcripts or in any publications. This should take about 30 minutes.
Please tell me about your organization’s management responsibilities.
(Setting the stage here to have the scope of jurisdiction and mandate in their words, and get at
interactions among stakeholders)
Follow up (FUP) A: Could you tell me a bit about the current priorities your organization has?
FUP B: Does your organization interact with other local, state, regional or even federal agencies or companies to do
its work?
And what specifically does your work entail?
FUP A: So you manage …. What does that actually mean as far as your daily work is concerned?
FUP B: Who do you interact with regularly to accomplish this?
FUP C: How long have you been in this position?
FUP D: What is your education background (degrees and discipline)?
Can you describe the decision-making process for long-term planning and investing bit more?
These questions are likely to bring out issues of conflict, institutional cooperation or lack thereof. They are included
for completeness.
FUP A: Who applies/proposes/initiates?....
FUP B: Who else is involved?
FUP C: Are your decisions reviewed by some higher authority?
FUP D: Can anyone appeal or supersede your decisions? How does that process work?
FUP E: What information is required so you can make an adequate assessment?
FUP F: How long does it take to complete one project/application? How often do you have to make these kinds of
decisions?
FUP E: What are the most significant changes in your work in the last five years (assuming the person has been in
this or similar position for this long)
This research is about the “port system.” This includes all of the various functions, costs, and benefits of the port
that could be of concern for the region. Please tell us about your organization’s management or planning
responsibilities in terms of the port system.
FUP A: Could you tell me a bit about the current priorities your organization has with respect to the port?
FUP B: Does your organization interact with other local, state, regional or even federal agencies or companies to do
its work and meet its port-related goals?
FUP C: How does the port fit under your organization’s mandate?
FUP C: How does the port fit under your organizations jurisdiction?
FUP D: To what extent is your organization dependent on the success of the port?
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Section II. Impacts of storm events (20 minutes)
INFO: Present the interviewee with the storm scenario and functions of the port.
Let’s turn to your experience with Sandy. The port has a number of functions for the region and these functions were
impacted by the storm. As we go through the rest of the interview, I’d like you to consider this storm event and the
functions of the port as you answer the questions.
Did you have to prepare/account/plan for these kinds of events?
FUP A: In what ways, how so, etc.
Consider how Sandy impacted Red Hook Terminal and the surrounding neighborhood. How did the storm affect the
resources and responsibilities within your jurisdiction (including infrastructure, social well-being, ecosystems, etc.)?
FUP A: What were your immediate concerns?
FUP B: What impacts were difficult to address in the immediate aftermath?
FUP C: Can you get more specific on what the impacts were?
Probe for STEEPLE impacts – six drivers of decision making (drivers of change)
S – Social T – Technological EN – Environmental EC – Economic P – Political LE – Legal
Environmental
Social
Economic
Infrastructure
Petroleum Release Jobs
Lost business
Power outage
lost/unemployment
Hazmats released

Jobs created

Tenants relocate

Water supply

Debris (small)
Debris (large)

Workers displaced

Cleanup costs
Preparation costs
Repair costs
Damage to product
Can’t get insurance

Utilities (general)
Cranes damaged
Roads/Bridges
Rail
Piers
On-site buildings

Other
Loss of
competitive
advantage
Fences and
signs
Tree debris
Lost data

FOR EACH IMPACT:
You described one impact … How was your organization affected by that impact?
INFO: Interested not only in damage and costs but also effects on ability to operate.
FUP A: How did operations have to change to accommodate the impact?
FUP B: How long did the impact affect operations?
FUP C: Were there permanent consequences of that impact on the organization?
Who else was affected in that way by that impact?
How did your organization deal with that impact?
FUP A: What resources were available to you to respond? Were they sufficient?
FUP B: What plans or policies did you have in place? Were they effective?
FUP C: What information was available to you to enable decision-making? Was it sufficient?
Who was responsible for dealing with or resolving the consequences of that impact?
INFO: I am interested not just in who paid and how they paid for it, but also who had to dedicate time and labor,
handle paperwork and liaise with other organizations.
FUP A: Was the impact anticipated or was there a gap in responsibilities or organizations’ understanding of each
other’s responsibilities?
Who actually ended up dealing with or resolving the consequences of that impact?
FUP A: Did someone have to step in to handle the impact?
FUP B: Was there a gap in responsibilities or organizations’ understanding of each other’s responsibilities?

5

Has your organization changed any policies or taken any steps to prepare for the next storm, in response to your
experiences dealing with that impact?
Closing. [at discretion, depending on length of interview]
Is there anything else we might have missed that you want to add about the storm resilience process you’ve gone
through so far?
Are there any other stakeholders for Red Hook Terminal that I should be speaking with for this project? Who in that
organization should I speak to about these issues?
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1 – Interviewees
Stakeholder
Internal
External: Public Policy

Organization
Port Authority of New
York & New Jersey
US Coast Guard

External: Community

PortSide NewYork

Port Interest
Lessor of Terminal land and
facilities
Inspect and maintain waterways and
port security
Preserve and advocate for maritime
culture in Red Hook

Interviews
2
2
1

Table 2 – Written Sources
Source

Title

Type

Objectives

Smythe 2013

Assessing the Impacts of Hurricane Sandy
on the Port of New York and New Jersey’s
Maritime Responders and Response
Infrastructure
Lessons from Hurricane Sandy for Port
Resilience

Academic

DesRoches &
Murrell 2014

Transportation Infrastructure Resiliency
Guidelines for the Port Authority of New
York & New Jersey

Academic

PortSide
NewYork 2016

Red Hook WaterStories:
Red Hook Container Terminal

Virtual
Museum

NYS2100 2013

Recommendations to Improve the Strength
and Resilience of the Empire State's
Infrastructure

Gov't Report

NIAC 2015

Transportation Sector Resilience
Final Report and Recommendations

Gov't Report

MarEx Staff 2012

Update: Assessment and Response from
Storm Damage Caused by Hurricane Sandy
Begins
Sandy snarls NY Harbor oil logistics,
NYMEX gasoline delivery
More NY oil terminals online, gasoline
lines persist post Sandy
Port resumes operations in Sandy's wake

Journalism

Identify lessons learned
from maritime responders,
including first responders,
to Sandy.
Interview stakeholders and
review design codes to
identify opportunities to
enhance resilience.
Describe changes to
PANYNJ Design
Guidelines made in postSandy review.
Record culture and history
of the Red Hook
community through oral
histories and feature essays.
Identify vulnerabilities and
recommend resilience
improvements for all state
infrastructure.
Identify gaps and
opportunities in national
transportation system
resilience.
October 30, 2012

Journalism

November 1, 2012

Journalism

November 4, 2012

Journalism

November 4, 2012

Wakeman &
Miller 2013

Campbell 2012
Gebrekidan 2012
Strunsky 2012

Academic
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Port Authority (Internal)

Table of direct damages reported by interviewees and reports. X’s
in rightmost columns indicate stakeholder groups which bore the
burden of recovering from each impact by, for instance, paying the
costs of repairs.

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Community

Tenants & Clients (Contractual)

X
X
X

Table 3 - Direct Damages

Public Policy

Operator (Internal)

Table 3 – Direct Damages

Damage to port facilities
Damage to berths
Damage to security cameras
Damage to security fence
Damage to water pump at fire stations
Damage to fuel pumps
Damage to oil tanks
Damage to pump stations
Damage to sheds
Damage to storm drains
Damage to transformers
Damage to underground infrastructure (generally)
Damage to port facilities (generally)
Damage to terminal equipment
Damage to cargo handling equipment
Damage to computer systems
Damage to cranes
Damage to CBP radiological screening equipment
Damage to trucks
Damage to vessels
Barge stranded on berth
Damage to barges (generally)
Damage to goods or cargo
Flooded cars
Containers washed away
Damage to goods or cargo (generally)

X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
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Costs of Recovery
Cost of renting generators to run cranes during repairs
Cost of environmental compliance during repairs
Cost of hiring private security during repairs to security systems
Obligation to conduct facility inspections to identify damages
Costs of retrieving rerouted cargo
Obligation to survey aids to navigation
Obligation to conduct facility security inspections
Obligation to survey waterways for shoaling
Obligation to survey waterways for debris/obstacles
Cost of oil spill containment
Costs of environmental hazard containment (generally)
Navigational Impairment
Damage to aids to navigation
Adrift vessels
Containers floating in the waterway
Debris in waterway
Interruptions to Operations
Closure of waterways
Damage to administrative offices impaired operations
Evacuation of vessels from the harbor
Lost wages
Interruption to operations during recovery (generally)
Impacts on Port-Dependent Commerce
Disruption of sewage transit services
Disruption of tug and barge service
Disruption of water taxi service
Disruption of ferry service
Cargo delayed and rerouted to other ports
Disruption of the flow of blood and medical supplies
Disruption of the flow of emergency supplies
Disruption of the flow of food supplies
Disruption of the flow of goods (generally)
Widespread, long-term fuel shortage

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

Community

Tenants & Clients
(Contractual)
Public Policy

Table of indirect reported by interviewees and reports. X’s in
rightmost columns indicate stakeholder groups which bore the
burden of recovering from each impact by, for instance, writing
off lost revenue.

Operator (Internal)

Table 4 - Indirect Costs

Port Authority (Internal)

Table 4 – Indirect Costs

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
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Table 5 – Intangible Consequences

Port Damages which Impair Port Recovery
Private operations cannot resume until PANYNJ operations resume
X
Disruption to communication systems
Inability to use roads due to damaged traffic signals
X
Inability to work effectively due to damaged lighting
X
Debris on roads and terminals
X
Damage to equipment for harbor surveying
Sewage backup from overflowing combined sewers
X
Damage to back-up generators
X
Emergency Conditions which Impair Port Recovery
Severe cold without fuel supplies
X
Obligation to revisit and reassess pre-storm long-term plans
X
Burdensome paperwork
X
Widespread, long-term power outages
X
Stress from performance of tasks outside training and job duties
X
Difficulty learning new disaster recovery regulations and procedures
X
Personnel unable to reach port facilities
X
Personnel contending with damage to own homes
X
Emotional toll of the widespread damage
X
Widespread devastation throughout the community (generally)
Port-Related Damages to the Surrounding Community
Ecological damage of oil spills
Oil carried inland by surge
Sediment washed onto shore
Containers washed onto shore
Consequences of Port Disruption to the Broader Economy
CBP operations delayed by damage to computer systems
Cruise ships rerouted from destination
Cruise ships' passengers' cars destroyed in terminal parking lots
Disruption of the flow of goods during the holiday season
Disruption of the global supply chain
Disruption of international fuel market due to fuel shortage
Impairment of regional recovery due to fuel shortage

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

Community

Tenants & Clients
(Contractual)
Public Policy

Operator (Internal)

Table of intangible consequences reported by interviewees and
reports. X’s in rightmost columns indicate stakeholder groups which
bore the burden of recovering from each impact by, for instance,
dedicating time and effort to resolving an impairment of normal
operations.

Port Authority (Internal)

Table 5 - Intangible Consequences

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
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Direct Damages – Damage to port facilities
Damage to underground infrastructure (generally)
X
X
X
Damage to port facilities (generally)
X
X
X
Direct Damages – Damage to terminal equipment
Damage to computer systems
X
X
X
Indirect Costs – Costs of Recovery
Cost of environmental compliance during repairs
X
X
X
Obligation to conduct facility security inspections
X
X
X
Costs of environmental hazard containment (generally)
X
X
X
Damage to administrative offices impaired operations
X
X
X
Interruption to operations during recovery (generally)
X
X
X
Intangible Consequences – Port Damages which Impair Port Recovery
Damage to lighting
X
X
X
Debris on roads and terminals
X
X
X
Intangible Consequences – Emergency Conditions which Impair Port Recovery
Severe cold weather following days after the storm cut off fuel supplies X
X
X
Obligation to revisit and reassess pre-storm long-term plans
X
X
X
Burdensome paperwork
X
X
X
Widespread, long-term power outages
X
X
X
Personnel must perform tasks outside their training and job duties
X
X
X
Difficulty learning new disaster recovery regulations and procedures
X
X
X
Personnel unable to reach port facilities
X
X
X
Personnel contending with damage to own homes
X
X
X
Emotional toll of the widespread damage
X
X
X

Community

Public Policy

Operator (Internal)

X’s in rightmost columns indicate stakeholder groups which bore the
burden of recovering from each impact.

Port Authority (Internal)

Table 6 – Impacts Reported as Affecting
4 or 5 Categories of Stakeholder

Tenants & Clients (Contractual)

Table 6 – Impacts Reported as Affecting 4 or 5 Categories of Stakeholder

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
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Figure 1:
Red Hook Container Terminal is in Brooklyn, New York, USA at the mouth of New York
Harbor and is the easternmost terminal in the Port of New York and New Jersey. The terminal is
positioned along Buttermilk Channel, across from Governor’s Island. Imagery generated by
Google.
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